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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study examines the effect of domestic political change on UN General Assembly voting.  
We argue that foreign policy change is most likely when a new leader comes to power who relies 
on different societal groups for support than her predecessor.   We then examine whether the 
extent to which foreign policy behavior changes with domestic interests depends on the domestic 
institutional context, specifically whether a country is a democracy or not. We test our 
hypotheses using a new measure of UNGA voting patterns and new data on changes in leaders’ 
supporting coalitions. We find that change in the societal support base of leaders leads to change 
in UN voting, especially in nondemocracies.  This study lends credence to the perspective that 
foreign policy, like domestic policy, can vary with the particular interests that leaders represent. 
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What causes change in foreign policy positions?  In part, foreign policy is driven by the 
exigencies and opportunities presented to a state as a function of its power and geographic 
position and the structure of the international system.  However, foreign policy is also influenced 
by state preferences, which in turn are determined through domestic political processes.  Thus, 
while change in foreign policy is influenced by changes in the international system and a state’s 
position within it, domestic politics could also play an important role.  Domestic political factors 
shaping a state’s foreign policy include not only changes in the institutions that structure politics, 
but also changes in which societal groups hold power within those institutions.   
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of changes in domestic sources of 
leader support on foreign policy.  Because leaders wish to stay in power, and because every 
leader relies on the support of some group of domestic actors to maintain her leadership position, 
leaders tend to pursue policies favored by their core societal support groups.  While foreign 
policy may not be the most important factor dividing groups within society, we argue that often 
domestic cleavages do correspond to different foreign policy preferences. Thus, when a leader 
comes to power who depends on a different constellation of societal groups for support than her 
predecessor, policy change, including foreign policy change, becomes more likely.  The level of 
change in foreign policy associated with changes in the domestic source of leader support may 
be mediated, however, by domestic political institutions.  Since democratic leaders require the 
support of larger proportions of the population to stay in power and are more constrained by 
other actors, democracies should exhibit more stability in foreign policy than nondemocracies. 
To test our argument about broad changes in the foreign policy positions of a state, we 
make use of voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).  The UNGA 
considers a wide variety of issues, which together reveal many aspects of a state’s international 
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alignments and foreign policy orientation (Voeten 2000, 2004). We take advantage of new data 
that allows us to capture over time changes in a country’s aggregate UNGA voting behavior and 
interpret positions on a consistent scale (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2013; Strezhnev and 
Voeten 2013). We have developed rules for distinguishing leadership changes that maintain the 
same domestic source of leader support from those in which the leader’s support base changes.  
Using these new data, we are able to examine whether changes in voting patterns correspond to 
periods in which a new leader has a different source of societal support from that of a previous 
leader.  
Predicting changes in foreign policy positions is important to policymakers, and it is also 
an area in which scholars have not been systematically successful. Our results show not only that 
foreign policymaking is shaped by the same factors as domestic policymaking, but that the 
competition among domestic groups is a powerful predictor of changes in foreign policy 
positions, even compared to a factor traditional international relations scholars would 
emphasize—the shift in the structure of the international system at the end of the Cold War.  We 
also find that changes in source of leader support result in greater foreign policy redirection in 
nondemocracies than in democracies. 
 
The Domestic Basis of Foreign Policy 
For much of the history of IR scholarship, analysts have implicitly or explicitly assumed 
that foreign policy is developed differently than domestic policy.  The analysis of domestic 
policy focuses on the outcome of competition among groups acting through particular political 
institutions, while foreign policy is often assumed to be driven by international imperatives or a 
commonly accepted view of “the national interest.”  Scholars recognize that domestic 
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competition may influence “low politics” areas such as trade policy, but typically consider other 
areas of foreign policy to be outside the realm of political competition and not subject to 
partisan, sectoral, ethnic, or regional interests.1 In fact, theories of most areas of foreign policy 
have traditionally turned to domestic politics only as an ad hoc explanation for behavior that 
appears unusual from the standpoint of international variables—for example, the isolationist turn 
of the United States between the two world wars.  As Narizny (2007:3) writes, “The extant 
literature …. views domestic politics as a constraint on the pursuit of the ‘national interest,’ not 
as the fundamental determinant of state behavior.” 
Increasingly, scholars have challenged this view.  Snyder (1991) argues that overly 
expansionist grand strategies have their roots in the economic interests of narrow sectors and the 
ability of these sectors to logroll. Narizny (2003, 2007) posits that class and sectoral interests 
influence alliance policy and grand strategy. Solingen (2007) contends that even nuclear 
weapons policies are influenced by the economic interests and ideologies of leaders and their 
ruling coalitions. Fordham (1998) shows that the economic make-up of districts helps to explain 
foreign policy voting in the US Senate in the crucial early Cold War period when US grand 
strategy was being defined. Importantly, all of these authors suggest that different economic 
interests may exist within a state simultaneously and compete with one another for control of 
policy.  The result is that changes in the coalitions that have power domestically can result in 
changes in foreign policy even in the area of “high politics.” 
Economic interests are not the only source of different foreign policy preferences within 
states.  Regional, religious, ethnic, and ideological divisions may also affect a state’s general 
foreign policy orientation.  Davis and Moore (1997), for example, find evidence that when an 
                                                 
1 For a review of the literature linking domestic politics to trade policy, see Milner (1999). 
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ethnic minority has political influence in a state, that state is more likely to engage in 
international conflict with states repressing members of the same ethnic group. Haas (2005) and 
Rathbun (2004) argue that the ideological beliefs of leaders and their supporting coalitions 
influence international alignments and support for peace enforcement missions. Finally, 
Trubowitz (1998) interprets major disputes over American grand strategy as conflicts among 
regional interests—North vs. South and East vs. West—that emerge as a result of uneven 
regional economic development. 
While certainly IR scholars have embraced the importance of domestic influences on 
foreign policy, much of the large N research on this subject has emphasized the influence of 
domestic political institutions. These institutions, which define the decision-making process and 
accountability structure for a regime, change little across time and best provide cross-sectional 
explanations for variation in foreign policy.  By contrast, the policies pursued by leaders through 
these institutions reflect shorter-term change in the groups to whom they are accountable. We 
believe changes in which domestic interests support the leader can provide considerable 
additional leverage in understanding changes in a state’s alignments and foreign policy positions. 
Consider, for instance, the following examples.  In Ukraine, a major source of political 
competition is between ethnic Russians based primarily in the East and ethnic Ukrainians based 
largely in the West.  While under President Yushchenko Ukraine actively pursued NATO 
membership, the election of Yanukovych in 2010 was followed nearly immediately by a halting 
of that process.  There are no obvious institutional or international changes that can account for 
this sudden shift in alignment strategy (Shoemaker 2013:176).  Similarly, in 2005, President 
Akayev of Kyrgyzstan, who was associated with a clan from the North, resigned after protests.  
His successor was Bakiyev, who was associated with a southern clan.  The South is not only 
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poorer, but also includes many ethnic Uzbeks and a more conservative Muslim population than 
is found in the North (Olcott 2005:108).  Bakiyev pursued a “more independent foreign policy” 
that was perceived as more confrontational to the US (Cooley 2012:233).     
In this paper, we build on the idea that despite the constraints and imperatives of the 
international system, leaders retain meaningful choices in the foreign policies they pursue.  As 
we elaborate below, we believe that these choices are influenced by the interests and preferences 
of societal groups that the leader represents and the domestic institutional context.  
 
 Domestic Interests, Institutions, and Foreign Policy Change 
In 1997, Moravscik published an influential outline of liberal IR theory, which, in his 
view, gives primacy of place to the interests of domestic groups and their differing abilities to 
influence state leaders (Moravscik 1997).  We build our theory on assumptions similar to 
Moravscik’s.  We assume that, within societies, there are more or less well defined groups of 
like-minded individuals who share political interests as a result of their economic, ethnic, 
religious, regional, or other characteristics and thus have similar policy preferences on at least 
some issues.  These groups compete with one another for political influence.  We further assume 
that leaders wish to stay in power and that maintaining power requires retaining the support of 
some subset of these societal groups.  The number of supporters necessary to stay in power 
depends on the country’s political institutions.  Yet, the number of necessary supporters is 
smaller than the total set of people with a say in choosing leaders.  (In Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, 
Siverson, and Morrow’s (2003) terms, the winning coalition is smaller than the selectorate.) 
Thus, a leader may be replaced by a successor who depends on the support of a different subset 
of the population for the retention of power even without significant institutional change. 
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Given that different domestic groups may have divergent preferences regarding 
international issues, we expect that foreign policy changes are most likely when a leader who 
depends on the support of a different societal group, and thus caters to different interests and 
preferences than her predecessor, comes to power.  On the other hand, when a leader relies on 
the same source of support as her predecessor, we should see less change in policy.   
Consider, for instance, the 2005 transition from Khatami to Ahmadinejad in Iran.  While 
Supreme Leader Khamenei possesses ultimate authority over Iran’s foreign policy and there 
were no obvious institutional changes accompanying this transition, the Khatami government 
took a more conciliatory approach to the West and embraced aspects of globalization, while 
Ahmadinejad was a staunch anti-Americanist, famous for his tirades in the UNGA.  Khatami 
relied on the support of “technocrats, younger entrepreneurs, and bazaar (bazaari) merchants and 
traders pressing for decreased state control, [seeking] privatization, increased trade with Europe 
and Asia, a utilitarian over an ideological approach to foreign policy, and decreased tensions 
with international institutions” as well as women and youth who did not share the same 
revolutionary fervor as their parents (Solingen 2007:178). Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, had 
the support of the Revolutionary Guards, paramilitary youth groups, and social conservatives 
among the clergy and bazaari. Ahmadinejad opted for inward-looking economic policies that 
benefitted his supporters.  Even Iran’s nuclear policy can be seen as advancing his supporters’ 
interests since sanctions shelter their businesses from competition and allow them to benefit from 
selling banned products (Solingen 2007:180-181). 
Leaders with different sources of societal support sometimes prefer to pursue different 
foreign policies.  Yet, whether a change in the domestic source of leader support actually results 
in noticeable change in foreign policy positions might also depend on the domestic institutional 
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context.   There are two important sets of political institutions within states that influence the 
extent to which new leaders representing different core societal interests are likely to redirect 
foreign policy: those affecting the rules of leader selection and those affecting the rules of 
policymaking. 
  According to Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003) selectorate theory, rules of leader 
selection that require leaders to gain the support of large numbers of citizens (as we expect in 
democracies) encourage leaders to pursue policies that provide public goods.  The incentive to 
produce broader public goods should create consistency in the types of policies pursued by 
different democratic leaders.   In addition, when winning coalitions are large, it is likely that 
some members of one leader’s winning coalition also are incorporated in her successor’s 
winning coalition.  While a leader might represent primarily interests on the right of the political 
spectrum and her successor might represent those on the left, both leaders should seek to include 
some centrist elements (that is, the median voter) in their coalitions.  Thus, the need to provide 
public goods to one’s winning coalition and the incentive to appeal to the median voter should 
induce some level of consistency in the policies of democratic leaders. 
On the other hand, leaders operating in systems in which only a small number of 
supporters is necessary to stay in power benefit most from providing private goods to their 
“winning coalition.”  When a new leader in a small winning coalition state (as in many 
nondemocracies) comes to power, there may be little overlap in coalition members and the 
particularistic policies preferred by her small coalition compared to her predecessor’s. Compared 
to democracies, we should see greater change on average between the policies of leaders with 
different support coalitions when those leaders depend on the support of only a few to stay in 
office (McGillivray and Smith 2008).   
9 
 
The rules of leadership selection thus influence the extent to which leaders are likely to 
pursue broad-based public policies as opposed to the provision of narrowly-based private goods, 
and the probability that there is overlap between one ruler’s supporting coalition and that of her 
successor.  Rules governing the policymaking process also have an influence on the ease with 
which a new leader can implement the policies she prefers.  Some chief executives are relatively 
unconstrained in their ability to make and change policy.  On the other hand, many chief 
executives operate in systems in which the consent of other political actors is necessary for the 
formulation of policy.  The latter is more often associated with democracies.  Legislatures, for 
example, often have influence over the appropriation of funds, personnel appointments, the 
implementation of executive directives, and treaty ratification, which are important for the 
pursuit of foreign policy (Martin 2000).   Similarly, coalition partners and subnational leaders 
often have a say in policymaking and a role in mobilizing resources for policy implementation.  
The need to cooperate with other actors, some of whom may represent interests outside the chief 
executive’s own winning coalition, might limit the extent to which a new leader can pursue a 
foreign policy that is notably different from her predecessor’s.   
Democracies generally combine features of leadership selection rules and policymaking 
rules that should discourage dramatic change in policy.  Thus, given a change in the core societal 
supporting coalition of a leader, foreign policy positions should be subject to less subsequent 
change in democratic systems than in nondemocratic ones. This is in line with previous 
arguments about democratic stability, many of which were developed and tested with formal 
international agreements in mind (for example, Gaubatz 1996; Martin 2000; Lipson, 2003; 
Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel 2009). While democracies should display more consistent foreign 
policy patterns than nondemocracies, we believe that in all states change in foreign policy 
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positions is more likely when new domestic groups gain influence over policymaking than it is 
when leaders depend on similar domestic groups to retain power.   
 
Domestic Political Change and Voting in the UN General Assembly 
An arena in which we may be able to witness and measure changes in the general foreign 
policy orientation of states is voting in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The 
UNGA is the only forum in which all countries have the opportunity to express their views on 
issues that confront the international community.  While wealthy and powerful countries are able 
to communicate their foreign policy positions in a number of ways (through foreign aid, 
economic sanctions, or the use of force, for instance), the foreign policy tools of developing 
states tend to be more limited. For them, the UNGA annual meetings provide a particularly 
valuable opportunity for making their views heard (Vengroff 1976; Moon 1985).  
The UNGA covers a wide range of international issues such as the North-South gap, 
disarmament, and human rights. Occasionally topics covered in the UNGA are directly relevant 
to domestic constituencies, and different societal groups take different stances on these issues 
(Moon 1985).  Many issues considered by the UNGA, however, do not map directly to domestic 
cleavages.  On these issues, large portions of the domestic population are likely indifferent to the 
specific topics under consideration in the UNGA.  Thus, we do not see UNGA voting as directly 
reflecting the interests of domestic groups with regard to particular votes.  Instead, we view 
UNGA voting patterns as providing an indirect reflection of the foreign policy position of a state 
that corresponds to the broad preferences of domestic groups for alignment with or distance from 
particular states.  Many UNGA resolutions, for example, represent declarations of affinity or 
disagreement with other states, and governments’ votes on these topics reflect their 
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constituencies’ preferences of who to ally with and who to oppose on the international stage. In 
the aggregate, a country’s voting record in the UNGA is a latent indicator of its foreign policy 
orientation and international alignments; it is a record of how the state wants to be seen by 
others, the international norms it finds acceptable, and the positions it is willing to take publicly 
on a wide variety of issues.   
 UNGA voting is particularly informative regarding domestically motivated changes in a 
country’s foreign policy positions for three reasons. First, unlike treaty cooperation, UN voting is 
not regulated by international law and countries are free to revise their positions as frequently 
and as much as they desire. Second, the non-binding nature of most UNGA resolutions makes it 
more likely that a country’s overall behavior can reflect a reaction to the views of important 
domestic constituencies rather than international strategic considerations (Gartzke 1998; Voeten 
2001). While some scholars have argued that UNGA votes may be “bought,” the conditions 
under which aid or loans influence UNGA voting appear to be limited, and evidence concerning 
the conditions under which this phenomenon occurs is mixed (for example, Wang 1999; Lai and 
Morey 2006; Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008; Carter and Stone forthcoming; Dreher and 
Sturm 2012).  Moreover, the willingness to sell one’s vote is also an indication of foreign policy, 
and thus even if such transfers occur, they would not undermine our claim that the aggregation of 
UNGA votes serves as a representation to the world of a state’s chosen policy positions.  Third, 
unlike many other foreign policy behaviors, UN voting does not strictly involve interdependence 
among states.  For trade to occur, an alliance to form, or a war to start, at least two states must 
choose to participate.  UNGA voting, on the other hand, may involve consultations with other 
countries but ultimately reflects autonomous decisions by each government. Thus UN voting 
patterns can more easily change as the result of domestic political shifts in a state. 
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The universal membership of the UNGA, the opportunity it provides to all states to 
express their positions on different international issues, the lack of international legal constraints, 
and the fact that voting is a monadic activity make the UNGA an excellent forum for studying 
countries’ foreign policy positions. In fact, the extent to which two countries vote together on 
UNGA resolutions forms the basis for a commonly used measure of interest similarity and 
international alignment (Gartkze 1998).  
We are not the first to consider the influence of domestic political changes on UN voting.  
Early studies by Vengroff (1976) and Moon (1985) focus on the effect of domestic instability, 
especially violent leader transitions, on UN voting and report mixed findings. Hagan (1989) 
expands the scope of domestic changes to include non-violent changes in leadership that bring to 
power different groups from the same or opposite end of the political spectrum and shows that 
both revolutionary and non-revolutionary changes influence Third World countries’ alignment 
with the US between 1946 and 1984. Voeten (2001) moves beyond Hagan’s study by expanding 
the empirical domain to all countries, but at the same time returns to a more limited focus on 
how institutional shifts affect foreign policy.  Finding little support for his hypotheses, he 
concludes that “the current dominant focus in the IR literature on the effects of domestic 
institutions is too restricted. The interaction between institutional arrangements and societal 
preferences produces political outcomes” (2001:31). 
Recent studies have picked up on the notion that societal preferences and the resulting 
policy orientation of governments should affect a country’s UN voting record. Potrafke (2009) 
shows that OECD countries are less likely to vote similarly to the US when their leaders are from 
left-leaning parties, and that this relationship is particularly strong when the US President is a 
Republican. Dreher and Jensen (2013) demonstrate that when a state’s leader is of similar 
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political orientation (that is, left or right) as the US President, the country is more likely to vote 
similarly to the US. 
While Hagan (1989), Potrafke (2009), and Dreher and Jensen (2013) direct attention to 
the importance of domestic preferences and government policy orientation, they do not consider 
the constraining effect of different domestic political structures. Yet, like Voeten, we believe that 
state policy derives from the interaction between domestic interests and institutions. Our study 
thus sets out to connect these two components of the domestic political process and to examine 
their effect on voting in the UNGA, using a larger sample than previous studies as well as a new 
measure of changes in domestic preferences. We also make use of a measure of UNGA voting 
that does not depend on a comparison between the voting records of two states and thus allows 
us to disentangle which side is changing policy when two states move apart; this is crucial for 
evaluating our hypotheses about the influence of domestic political change on an individual 
country’s behavior. In addition, this measure accounts for the problem of different issues being 
considered by the UNGA from one session to the next (Voeten 2013).   
One thing to keep in mind when assessing the interaction of domestic political 
preferences with institutions is that, in UNGA voting, the influence of executive constraints 
should be somewhat muted in comparison to other policies like treaty formation or abrogation, 
the waging of war, or trade policy.  Most UN votes do not require much consultation with other 
domestic actors directly.  On the other hand, the appointment of UN ambassadors may be subject 
to legislative confirmation or compromise with coalition partners, and many UN votes do pave 
the way for foreign policy actions that require legislative action, for example treaty ratification or 
budgetary appropriations.  Furthermore, leaders who have difficulty engaging in political action 
without the support of other actors will avoid casting domestically unpopular votes in the 
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General Assembly in order to ensure domestic veto players’ support on issues where those actors 
do have a gate-keeping role.  Since democratic leaders both operate under conditions of higher 
executive constraint and derive their policy preferences from the need to satisfy larger 
constituencies, democracies should exhibit more stability than nondemocracies in UNGA voting 
patterns, but the distinction may be less stark than in policy arenas in which other political actors 
have more direct influence on the policy process, for instance, treaty formation.   
In the next sections we describe our research design and test the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1:  Leadership changes accompanied by changes in domestic sources of 
leader support are associated with more change in the state’s UNGA voting pattern than 
either years without leadership changes or leadership changes that are not accompanied 
by changes in domestic sources of leader support.   
Hypothesis 2:  Democratic states show more consistency in UNGA voting patterns than 
nondemocratic states. 
Hypothesis 3:  The impact of changes in domestic sources of leader support on changes 
in UNGA voting patterns is stronger in nondemocracies than in democracies. 
 
Research Design 
In order to test our hypotheses we take advantage of countries’ yearly voting records in 
the UNGA between 1946 and 2008. Using the country-year as the unit of analysis allows us to 
contrast years in which a new leader with a different source of societal support comes to power, 
years in which there is a leader change but the new leader represents the same segment of society 
as her predecessor, and years in which there is no leadership transition.  We expect that, on 
average, UNGA voting change is most likely to be observed in years in which a new leader with 
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a different supporting coalition assumes office.2 We identify the leaders in office each year using 
the Archigos data (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009).3 Since voting in the UNGA 
typically occurs late in the year,4 the country’s voting record in leader transition years is 
attributed to the new leader rather than her predecessor. The exceptions are leader transitions that 
occur in the month of December. In the case of December leader transitions we attribute the 
country’s voting record in that year to the leader in power before December 1st. If there are 
multiple leader transitions in a given year, we code the leader in power during November as the 
leader in charge of the country’s voting in that year.5 
Because we are interested in the change in the state’s ideal point from the previous year, 
data from the first UNGA session for each state during our observation period is not included in 
the analysis.  We also drop state-years in which the country did not vote in the UNGA.  Finally, 
                                                 
2 The full extent of a country’s foreign policy change may not be observed immediately after a 
new leader takes office. Despite this limitation, we expect a new leader’s first year to be 
associated with enough UNGA vote change to mark any distinct departure from her 
predecessor’s policies.  
3 Archigos covers all independent countries from 1875-2004. Leadership transitions from 2005-
2008 are coded based on worldstatesmen.org.  
4 During the 1946-2008 period, December is the month with the highest number of votes 
(74.7%), followed by November (15.2%), and then October (3.5%). The remaining 6.6% of 
votes occur between January and September (Strezhnev and Voeten 2013). 
5 To ensure that these coding decisions do not unduly affect the results we conducted a 
robustness check excluding years in which leaders took office in December as well as the 
subsequent year. We find that the results described below hold. 
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we exclude years with interim leaders who do not represent any particular societal groups but 
rather are tasked with maintaining the status quo until a new regular leader takes office.6 This 
leaves us with 7,049 state-years from 165 countries. 
 Since we are interested in the determinants of change in UNGA voting for each year 
within each state, we employ state-level fixed effects in all models used below. This approach 
allows us to fully account for any unmeasured factors associated with particular countries and to 
isolate the effect of our independent variables on the variation within each state group.  Thus we 
are not examining cross-sectional variation, but rather each state’s degree of UNGA voting 
change in different years.  
 
Measuring Changes in Foreign Policy Positions Using UNGA Voting 
Our interest is in measuring changes in foreign policy positions that may arise from 
changes in political leadership. While individual UNGA votes do not necessarily capture specific 
foreign policy action, we argue that the pattern of voting captures latent tendencies in a nation’s 
foreign policy orientation and international alignments. Behind the disparate topics on which 
votes occur is an underlying dimension of international cooperation and conflict that reflects the 
broader foreign policy positions of states, large and small.  
Our measure of foreign policy change based on countries’ UNGA voting patterns must 
therefore be capable of capturing a latent foreign policy tendency driving a large number of 
individual choices across a range of topics. It must also fulfill three additional requirements. 
First, our measure must capture short-term changes in foreign policy that could potentially vary 
                                                 
6 Including years with interim leaders (and coding them as cases of leader transition in which the 
leader’s domestic source of support stays the same) produces substantively similar results. 
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across any changes in leadership. Second, it must establish continuity across periods such that 
the choices made in the UNGA are comparable from session to session, rather than subject to the 
varying agenda of that body. Finally, our measure should detect change in each country without 
relying on relative similarity to any one country. By tracking a country’s behavior only relative 
to the United States, for instance, we lose the ability to account for changes in the United States 
itself. 7 
Recently, Bailey, et al. (2013) developed a measure that addresses each of these issues.8 
They estimate the ideal points of states across time using a spatial voting model adapted to the 
UN setting. Using an approach similar to that of Bailey (2007), votes that occur in multiple 
sessions serve as “bridge votes” to anchor the preference space shared by actors across different 
time periods. This ensures that choices in different periods can be compared, despite changes in 
the UN agenda from session to session (Voeten 2013). The result of this process is an estimate of 
the ideal point for each country in each session that is comparable to the country’s estimates in 
other sessions—that is, on the same scale—yet sensitive to any changes in each state’s pattern of 
voting relative to other states on the scale.  From these ideal point data, we generate a continuous 
                                                 
7 Many scholars investigating change in UN voting have employed the affinity score (Gartzke 
1998) to assess how alignment with the US changes over time.  A problem with this measure for 
our purposes is that it does not take into account movement in the US position itself.  As Voeten 
(2004) and Bailey et al. (2013) note, the US’s UNGA voting behavior has changed over time, 
and thus changes in similarity between the voting records of other states and the US might not 
reflect changes in the votes of other states at all. Despite this limitation, we conducted an 
alternate analysis using the affinity measure and found that the results described below hold. 
8 These data are included as part of the Strezhnev and Voeten (2013) dataset.  
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measure of yearly changes in foreign policy positions, using the absolute value of the difference 
between the nation’s ideal point in one year relative to the previous year.  
 
Measuring Changes in Domestic Sources of Leader Support and Regime Type 
In order to assess the effect of changes in domestic interests on UNGA voting, we need to 
identify instances in which a leader comes to power who has a different source of leader support 
(SOLS) than her predecessor.9 In our coding of SOLS changes, we rely solely on accounts of the 
domestic base of support of leaders and code SOLS changes independently of policy outcomes.10 
To the extent possible, we also separate changes in domestic sources of leader support from 
changes in domestic political institutions. 
Our coding rules for SOLS changes differ depending on a country’s regime type. We 
code country-years as democratic if they have a POLITY IV democracy score of six or higher 
                                                 
9 To identify these cases, we build on the coding rules developed by Leeds et al. (2009). We 
extend their data by including all countries with a population larger than 500,000. Teams of 
coders at two different universities coded each case. Inter-coder reliability was high, with 
agreement in 93.4% of state-years with leadership transitions during 1945-2008.  
10 Note that our coding is designed only to measure when a leader is replaced with a leader from 
a distinct SOLS, as needed to test the hypotheses above. Given the wide range of domestic 
political environments represented in our broad sample of states, it is not possible to capture the 
specific foreign policy preferences of each SOLS and thus to predict a direction of change. 
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and nondemocratic otherwise (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010).11 In democracies, we 
conceptualize a leader’s SOLS as those who vote for or associate with the leader’s party. We 
follow the basic rule that whenever a leader with a different party affiliation comes to power, this 
constitutes a SOLS change. In cases in which a leader is an independent we follow two rules: (i) 
if the new leader is the pre-designated successor of the old leader, we code no SOLS change. 
Pre-designated successors are vice presidents, those appointed by the outgoing leader, or 
relatives (brother, son) of the old leader; (ii) if the voters who elected both leaders are similar 
based on their regional, ethnic, class etc. characteristics, we also code no SOLS change. 
In nondemocracies, the identification of SOLS changes is more challenging. Here we rely 
primarily on Geddes, Wright, and Frantz’s (2012) classification of post-1945 autocracies as 
single-party, military, personalist, monarchical systems or combinations thereof. The use of this 
categorization scheme is appropriate because their coding criteria “emphasize control over 
access to power and influence rather than formal institutional characteristics” (Geddes 
1999:123). Geddes et al.’s classifications are thus based on identification of the groups that form 
the leader’s support base and hold sway over policymaking. When these support bases change, 
we should be more likely to observe shifts in foreign policy.12 
                                                 
11 Interruptions (-66) or interregna (-77) are considered to be nondemocratic years. Transition 
periods (-88) are coded as democratic or nondemocratic based on Cheibub, Gandhi, and 
Vreeland (2010). 
12 Some of these changes may also entail institutional change within the broader category of 
autocracies. In our data, about 30% of SOLS changes in the nondemocratic sample are associated 
with a change from one distinct Geddes et al. (2012) category (single party, personalist, military 
regime, or monarchy) to another, and institutional change might have accompanied some other 
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Because in single-party systems consecutive leaders are accountable to the party cadre, 
and because party elites are likely to share basic policy preferences over time, we code no SOLS 
changes for the duration of a single-party regime. For instance, none of the leader transitions in 
Singapore during the observation period are coded as SOLS changes. Similarly, we code no 
SOLS changes for the duration of a single military regime. Studies suggest that military officers 
share an overarching commitment to advancing the military interest, and military leaders depend 
heavily on the support of other high-ranking military officers within their regime (Geddes 
1999:126). Thus, different leaders within the same military regime, such as Algeria’s Zéroual 
and Bouteflika, should be expected to pursue relatively similar policies.  
In personalist systems, because a leader’s support group consists of a clique of family and 
friends that are loyal to that particular leader, changes in leadership are usually accompanied by 
changes in the source of leader support. Exceptions are pre-designated successors who build on 
the outgoing leader’s supporters and should continue to pursue policies that are in the clique’s 
interest. Thus, in personalist systems, we code SOLS changes if a new leader who is not a pre-
designated successor assumes office. For instance, as noted above, we coded the personalist-to-
personalist leader transition in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 as a SOLS change, since the new leader, 
Bakiyev, was an opposition leader who was not favored by his predecessor’s, Akayev’s, clique. 
Conversely, Joseph Kabila’s assumption of power in the DRC after his father Laurent Kabila 
was assassinated is not a SOLS change since Joseph could count on his father’s supporters. In 
monarchies, if a ruler descends from the same dynasty as her predecessor, the source of support 
                                                                                                                                                             
SOLS changes during periods not coded by Geddes et al. as meeting the criteria for their 
classifications. Thus, it is not possible to disentangle all forms of institutional changes in 
autocracies from simultaneous changes in the source of leader support.   
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is likely to stay the same and we thus code no SOLS change. An example here is the 1991 Saudi 
leader transition from Fahd to his half-brother Abdullah.13  
Some country-years cannot be classified according to the Geddes et al. (2012) scheme, 
however.  Most of these are country-years during which politics are in flux. Some of these cases 
are characterized by warlordism (where no particular leader can be said to be in control of the 
entire country and its policies) or foreign occupation (where no real domestic competition exists 
because policies are directed by outsiders).  We treat cases in which no domestic actor has clear 
control over the foreign policy apparatus as experiencing no changes in domestic sources of 
support during the period of incapacity.  Examples here are leader transitions in Liberia during 
the civil war and Lebanon during Syrian interference. For countries that have functioning 
governments but still display too much ambiguity to assign them to any of the Geddes et al. 
(2012) categories, we use a pre-designated successor rule.  
Using these coding rules, we create a dummy variable, SOLS Change, that is coded 1 if a 
new leader with a different SOLS than her predecessor enters into office in a given year. We 
create an additional dummy variable, Other Leader Transition, to capture years in which a new 
leader comes to power who has the same societal support base as the outgoing leader. These two 
variables, SOLS Change and Other Leader Transition, are thus mutually exclusive. Democracy 
is coded 1 if the country is democratic (as described above) in both the year under observation 
and in the previous year. We expect year-to-year consistency only in a stable democratic regime. 
                                                 
13 Geddes et al. (2012) also code some countries as hybrids of two or more of the above regime 
types.  With some rare exceptions, we code no SOLS changes for the duration of a single hybrid-
regime.  We also categorize a few countries not coded by Geddes et al. according to their coding 
rules. We provide a list in our web appendix. 
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If a regime transition occurs and the current leader presides over a democracy but her 
predecessor did not, we would expect more change in UN voting. 
Of the 7,049 state-years from 1946-2008, 2,731 (39%) are state-years in which the 
country was democratic both during the current year and the previous year. 4,169 observations 
(59%) are cases of consecutive nondemocratic years.  In 149 observations (2%), the country 
experienced a transition from nondemocracy to democracy or vice versa. In 565 (21%) of the 
democratic state-years a leader transition occurs, compared to 439 (11%) of the nondemocratic 
country-years. Of democratic country-years that experience a leader transition, 346 (61%) 
involve a SOLS change and 219 (39%) do not. Of leader transitions in nondemocracies, 197 
(45%) are associated with SOLS changes and 242 (55%) are not. Thus, both leadership 
transitions and SOLS changes are more common in democracies.14   
 
Control Variables 
Following the insights of Achen (2005), Clarke (2005), and Ray (2003), we limit our 
control variables to factors that have the potential to affect both UNGA voting and SOLS 
changes and that should thus be included to guard against spurious findings. First, we control for 
alliance ties with the US throughout the entire time period and with the USSR until its 
dissolution in 1991 by including dummy variables for whether the country had a defense pact 
with either superpower in a given year. During the Cold War, a close relationship with the US or 
the USSR likely constrained both the possibility for domestic political change and foreign policy 
change in allied states. The constraining effect of alliance ties to the US is also likely to have 
                                                 
14 Differences between democracies and nondemocracies in terms of the frequency of leader 
transitions and SOLS changes are statistically significant. 
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persisted after the end of the Cold War into the unipolar world order. These variables, US Ally 
and USSR Ally, are coded based on the ATOP dataset (Leeds and Mattes 2007).15 In 2,326 
country-years (33%) the country had a defense pact with the US and in 302 country-years (4%) 
the country was a protégé of the USSR. 
Second, we control for the short-term effect of the end of the Cold War. The fall of the 
Iron Curtain was a watershed event that led both to significant international realignments and to 
domestic political changes in a number of countries. To ensure that we do not falsely attribute 
changes in UNGA voting to SOLS changes, when really both were due to the massive changes in 
the international system, we include a control for whether the year coincides with the end of the 
Cold War—1989 through 1991. This dummy variable, Cold War End, is coded 1 in each of these 
years for a total of 392 state-years (6%).  
Finally, we control for regime transitions. Regime transitions from democracy to 
autocracy and vice versa constitute significant changes in a country’s institutions that are likely 
to affect UN voting. Regime transitions also often involve changes in the source of leader 
support. Thus, in cases of regime transition, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of new 
institutions from the effects of changes in the leader’s societal support base. Yet, while regime 
transitions are usually accompanied by SOLS changes, SOLS changes also occur quite 
                                                 
15 As the ATOP (version 3.0) measure goes only until 2003, it is extrapolated to 2008. We treat 
those countries allied with the US in 2003 as continuing their alliance and those not allied as 
continuing not to be allied with the US.  Our interpretation of results is similar if we include a 
single variable indicating whether the state was allied to either the US or the USSR.  We have 
also examined a version using the COW data, version 4.1 (Gibler 2009): US ally is negative and 
statistically significant at the .1 level, but our main conclusions are similar. 
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frequently in the absence of this kind of dramatic institutional change.16  By controlling for years 
representing transitions between democracy and autocracy, we provide a more conservative test 
that is better at isolating the pure effects of changes in sources of leader support.  Regime 
Transition is coded 1 if there is a change in a country’s POLITY IV democracy score from 6 or 
above to below 6 or vice versa in a given year.17 149 (2%) of state-years experience such a 
regime transition. 
 
Empirical Results 
Given the continuous nature of our dependent variable-- the absolute change in the 
country’s UNGA ideal point from t-1 to t-- we use OLS regression. The dependent variable is 
logged in order to approximate a normal distribution. All models include state-level fixed effects, 
which account for unmeasured factors associated with particular countries. Thus, we estimate the 
effects of our independent variables on within-country variation in UNGA vote change.18 In 
addition, we also estimate robust standard errors clustered on the country in order to deal with 
                                                 
16 We code a SOLS change in 63% of regime transitions, but only 15% of SOLS changes 
occurred when there was also regime transition. The correlation between SOLS change and 
regime transition is 0.28. 
17 Given that UN voting occurs late in the year, we code regime transitions as affecting UN 
voting in the current year unless they occur in December, in which case they are coded as 
affecting voting in the following year.  
18 A Hausman test suggests that fixed effects are appropriate, but the results are substantively 
similar when employing state random effects. The results are also robust when the dependent 
variable is not logged. 
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remaining concerns regarding the nonindependence of observations stemming from the same 
state. 
We begin our analysis with a simple model that includes our main theoretical variables of 
interest: SOLS change, Other Leader Transition, and Democracy (Model 1). In a second model 
(Model 2), we then include the control variables: Regime Transition, Cold War End, US Ally, 
and USSR Ally.  
TABLE 1. Change in UNGA Voting as a Function of SOLS Change, Other Leader 
Transitions and Regime Type, 1946-2008 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Basic Model  
(No Controls) 
Basic Model  
(With Controls) 
Interactive Model 
(No Controls) 
Interactive Model 
(With Controls) 
     
SOLS Change 0.187*** 0.178*** 0.323*** 0.335*** 
 (0.050) (0.054) (0.080) (0.095) 
Other Leader Transition 0.074 0.072 0.090 0.090 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.076) (0.076) 
Democracy -0.383*** -0.360*** -0.350*** -0.332*** 
 (0.059) (0.062) (0.062) (0.064) 
SOLS Change X 
Democracy 
  -0.256*** 
(0.097) 
-0.271** 
(0.110) 
Other Leader Transition X 
Democracy 
  -0.041 
(0.118) 
-0.043 
(0.118) 
Regime Transition  0.066  -0.022 
  (0.114)  (0.125) 
Cold War End  0.058  0.058 
  (0.064)  (0.064) 
US Ally  -0.143  -0.149 
  (0.125)  (0.126) 
USSR Ally  0.078  0.086 
  (0.210)  (0.211) 
Constant -2.536*** -2.504*** -2.548*** -2.512*** 
 (0.024) (0.052) (0.026) (0.053) 
     
Observations 7,049 7,049 7,049 7,049 
Number of Countries 165 165 165 165 
(Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; two-tailed). 
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Models 1 & 2 both indicate a statistically significant positive effect of SOLS change on 
UNGA vote change. In line with Hypothesis 1, years in which a new leader with a different 
societal base of support than her predecessor assumes office experience significantly more 
UNGA vote change than years in which the same leader remains in power. On the other hand, 
leader transitions in which a new leader with the same domestic support groups comes to power 
do not appear to be associated with greater change in UNGA voting than years with no change in 
leader.  While positive, the coefficient for Other Leader Transition is not statistically significant.  
To compare the effect of SOLS changes and non-SOLS change leader transitions on 
UNGA voting, we conduct a Wald test. Despite the fact that the coefficient for SOLS Change is 
larger than that of Other Leader Transition, the two are not statistically different from one 
another at conventional levels (p=.152 for Model 1 and p=.189 for Model 2). We thus conclude 
that the empirical evidence for Hypothesis 1 is mixed. While SOLS changes are more 
consistently associated with UNGA vote change than other leader transitions, their effect is not 
necessarily larger in a sample of all cases. 
Regarding Hypothesis 2, we find that, as expected, democratic institutions have a 
constraining effect on a country’s foreign policy. The coefficient for Democracy is negative and 
statistically significant, indicating that there is significantly less year-to-year change in the 
UNGA voting patterns of continuing democracies than of nondemocracies.  
A comparison of Models 1 and 2 shows that our conclusions about Hypotheses 1 and 2 
are unaffected by the inclusion of the control variables: Regime Transition, Cold War End, US 
Ally, and USSR Ally.  None of the control variables reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance, though the coefficients for Regime Transition, Cold War End, and US Ally are in 
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the expected direction.19 It is noteworthy that the period from 1989-1991, which we would 
consider a period of major upheaval in the international system, does not appear to be associated 
with significant change in patterns of UNGA voting.20 
In order to establish how the effects of both SOLS changes and other leader transitions 
differ between democracies and nondemocracies, we estimate models that interact SOLS Change 
and Other Leader Transition with Democracy.21 Model 3 includes only the theoretical variables 
of interest and Model 4 introduces the control variables. In both models, the coefficient for SOLS 
Change X Democracy is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the effect of SOLS 
                                                 
19 Note that since Democracy measures whether the country is democratic in the current year and 
the previous year, the Regime Transition coefficient in this model should be interpreted in 
reference to the remaining category of continuing nondemocracies; we find no statistically 
significant difference between years of regime change and years of continuing nondemocracy, 
which are also less stable than continuing democracies. In a bivariate model, Regime Transition 
has a positive and statistically significant effect on UNGA voting change, as we would expect. 
20 However, when we disaggregate the Cold War End variable into dummies for each of the three 
years, we find that the 1991 indicator is positive and statistically significant. The size of this 
coefficient is not significantly different from that of SOLS change. 
21 Because, based on our coding rules, SOLS changes are always accompanied by leader 
transitions, we do not interact SOLS changes with leader transitions and include a three-way 
interaction with Democracy. Some of the categories of such interaction terms would be empty. 
All possible combinations of SOLS changes, leader transitions, and democratic institutions are 
captured by the inclusion of SOLS Change x Democracy and Other Leader Transition x 
Democracy.   
28 
 
changes is larger in nondemocracies than in democracies. In fact, while SOLS changes have a 
significant positive effect in non-democracies  (p< .001 in Models 3 & 4), they do not have a 
statistically significant effect in democracies (p=.265 in Model 3; p=.292 in Model 4). Compared 
to years with no leader transition, SOLS change years are more likely to exhibit change in UN 
voting in nondemocracies, but this is not consistently the case in democracies. This is fully in 
line with Hypothesis 3.  Furthermore, as the negative and statistically significant coefficient for 
Democracy indicates, democracies tend to exhibit less change in UNGA voting even in years in 
which there is no leadership change at all (i.e. when Other Leader Transition and SOLS Change 
are both 0).  
While we find clear differences regarding the effect of SOLS changes in democracies and 
nondemocracies, there is no indication that the effect of other leader transitions differs across the 
two regime types. While negative, the coefficient for Other Leader Transition X Democracy is 
not statistically significant.  Furthermore, the marginal effect of Other Leader Transition is 
neither significant in nondemocracies (p=.236 for Model 3; p=.240 for Model 4) nor in 
democracies (p=.577 for Model 3; p=.592 for Model 4). Whether in democracies or 
nondemocracies, leader transition years that are not also associated with a change in the source 
of leader support do not appear to experience greater UNGA vote change than years in which 
there is no leader transition. 
These results mirror the main findings from Models 1 & 2: SOLS changes consistently 
have a statistically significant positive effect on UNGA vote change, but other leader transitions 
do not. However, a difference between Models 1 & 2 and Models 3 & 4 emerges. Wald tests that 
compare the coefficients of SOLS Change and Other Leader Transition show that there is a 
statistically significant difference in the size of these coefficients (p=.043 for Model 3; p=.050 
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for Model 4).22 Nondemocracies experience significantly greater changes in UNGA voting 
patterns when a new leader with a different SOLS comes to power than when a leader that has 
the same SOLS comes to power or there is no leader change. In democracies, on the other hand, 
the effect of SOLS changes is no different from the effect of other leader transitions, which in 
turn is no different from years without a leader transition. Overall then we can conclude that our 
findings provide support for Hypothesis 3. 
In order to probe the robustness of our results, we estimated additional models with 
different specifications.23 First, we conducted analyses in which we contrasted democratic 
country-years with purely nondemocratic country-years, excluding cases of regime transition. 
The results are in line with our main findings: SOLS changes have a significant effect on UNGA 
vote change, especially in non-democracies, while other leader transitions do not; the coefficients 
for the two types of leader transitions are significantly different (p=.059 in Model 3; p=.053 in 
Model 4). We are thus confident that we are capturing differences between democracies and 
nondemocracies rather than between democracies and transitional regimes.  
Second, we conducted multiple analyses with additional control variables in Models 2 & 
4: absolute value of the percentage change in the country’s national capabilities from t-1 to t, 
absolute value of the percentage change in the country’s GDP per capita from t-1 to t, and a 
dummy variable for Cold War years. We find that year-to-year changes in relative capabilities 
                                                 
22 Given that these two coefficients capture the effect of these two types of leader transitions 
when Democracy is 0, we can conclude that there is a statistically significant difference between 
the effect of SOLS changes and the effect of other leader transitions for nondemocracies. 
23 Further information on the operationalization of new control variables and results of the 
robustness checks are available in the web appendix.  
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have a statistically significant positive effect on UNGA vote change, but year-to-year GDP 
changes do not. Interestingly and counter to traditional expectations, we also find that the 
average year-to-year changes in UNGA voting were significantly larger during the Cold War 
than thereafter. The main results are similar when these control variables are included: especially 
in non-democracies, SOLS changes have a significant effect on UNGA vote change, but other 
leader transitions do not; the coefficients for SOLS Change and Other Leader Transition are 
different at the 90% confidence level.   
Third, to ensure that our SOLS change variable is not simply capturing the effect of 
coups, revolts, or assassinations, we excluded the entire tenure of leaders who came to power 
through “irregular” means, as coded by Archigos (Goemans et al. 2009). When the control 
variables are included, we find that SOLS change does not have a statistically significant effect 
on UNGA vote change in the full sample (Model 2), but is statistically significant for 
nondemocracies (Model 4), as predicted by Hypothesis 3. Regarding Model 4, we also find that, 
as before, non-SOLS change leader transitions have no effect on UNGA vote change and that the 
coefficient associated with Other Leader Transitions is smaller than that of SOLS change, but the 
difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p=.174). Dropping all leaders 
who entered office through irregular means constitutes a hard test for the effect of SOLS 
changes, given that, in nondemocracies especially, the relationship between irregular leader 
transitions and SOLS changes may be that the latter drive the former rather than the other way 
around. Also, this entails dropping 32 percent of observations in the sample. Even in this hard 
test, however, we uncover basic patterns that are in line with our hypotheses: SOLS changes 
have a systematic and discernible impact on UNGA vote change in nondemocracies, while other 
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leader transitions that are not associated with a SOLS change have no clear effect on UNGA vote 
change.24  
Overall, we conclude that our hypotheses are largely supported.  The support for H1 is 
mixed.  SOLS changes have a statistically significant positive impact on change in UNGA voting 
patterns, while non-SOLS change leader transitions do not. Yet, the difference between SOLS 
change leader transitions and other leader transitions is not statistically significant in our full 
sample.  In support of H3, however, we find that the effect of SOLS changes on UN voting is 
particularly pronounced for nondemocracies, and in the case of nondemocracies, leader 
transitions accompanied by SOLS changes result in greater change in UNGA voting than years 
without leader transitions or other leader transition years.  We also find support for H2.  
Democracies exhibit more consistency in their UNGA voting than nondemocracies do.   
 
 
Conclusion 
IR scholarship has traditionally been more successful at explaining foreign policy 
continuity rather than change. Part of the problem lies in the excessive focus on the structure of 
the international system and basic state characteristics like power and geographic position. Given 
the relatively immutable nature of these factors, they explain continuity well but fall short if the 
goal is to predict change. The basic premise of this paper is that if we want to understand foreign 
policy change we need to consider domestic political processes. Domestic changes that bring to 
                                                 
24 To account for the potential importance of individual states and years to our results, we also 
ran each of our models dropping each state and each year from the sample. The results were 
substantively similar.  
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power new leaders with different societal support groups can be a powerful source of change. If 
leaders represent different interests and preferences than their predecessors, they may opt to 
pursue a distinct foreign policy course.  This effect is mediated, however, by domestic political 
institutions. Domestic changes should exert a stronger effect in nondemocracies than in 
democracies. 
Our empirical focus in this study lies in explaining changes in countries’ UN voting 
patterns. Voting in the UNGA is not only a frequently used measure of foreign policy 
preferences, but it is also particularly useful for gauging the effect of domestic political changes 
on foreign policy positions. The opportunity to vote in the UNGA occurs under virtually every 
leader, and voting is a monadic activity.  Leaders are constrained by international law when it 
comes to changing policies enshrined in treaties, but there are no such constraints on UN voting. 
This suggests that new leaders have more leeway in changing foreign policy positions in the UN 
than elsewhere. It also means that any stability that we observe is likely to have been induced by 
domestic institutions rather than international ones. 
 Using new data that allows us to measure change in UNGA voting and new data on 
changes in leaders’ sources of domestic support, we find that SOLS changes are consistently a 
significant predictor of foreign policy change in nondemocracies but not in democracies.  We 
also find that, in nondemocracies, the effect of SOLS changes on UNGA voting is larger than the 
effect of other leader transitions.  Finally, we observe more consistency in UNGA voting in 
democracies than nondemocracies, both in years with no leader transitions and in SOLS change 
years.  
 Our study supports a perspective that views foreign policymaking as intertwined with the 
domestic policymaking process, whereby groups compete to advance their interests and 
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implement their preferred policies within given institutional rules.  The fact that foreign policy 
generally involves strategic interaction with other states does affect both domestic competition 
over foreign policy and ultimate policy choices, but politics does not entirely “stop at the water’s 
edge.”  This suggests that policymakers hoping to predict foreign policy change should pay 
particular attention to the dynamics of domestic political competition and leadership selection, 
particularly in nondemocracies. 
34 
 
References 
 
ACHEN, CHRISTOPHER H.  (2005)  Let’s Put Garbage-Can Regressions and Garbage-Can Probits 
Where They Belong.  Conflict Management and Peace Science 22 (4): 327-339. 
BAILEY, MICHAEL A.  (2007)  Comparable Preference Estimates across Time and Institutions for 
the Court, Congress, and Presidency. American Journal of Political Science 51 (3): 
433-448. 
BAILEY, MICHAEL, ANTON STREZHNEV, AND ERIK VOETEN. (2013) Estimating Dynamic State 
Preferences from United National Voting Data (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 2330913). 
Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. Retrieved from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2330913 
BUENO DE MESQUITA, BRUCE, ALASTAIR SMITH, RANDOLPH M. SIVERSON, AND JAMES D. 
MORROW.  (2003)  The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
CARTER, DAVID B. AND RANDALL W. STONE.  forthcoming.  Democracy and Multilateralism: 
The Case of Vote Buying in the UN General Assembly.  International Organization. 
CHEIBUB, JOSE ANTONIO, JENNIFER GANDHI, AND JAMES VREELAND.  (2010)  Democracy and
 Dictatorship Revisited. Public Choice 144 (1-2): 67-101. 
CLARKE, KEVIN A.  (2005)  The Phantom Menace: Omitted Variable Bias in Econometric 
Research.  Conflict Management and Peace Science 22 (4): 341-352. 
COOLEY, ALEXANDER.  (2012)  Base Politics: Democratic Change and the US Military 
Overseas.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
DAVIS, DAVID R. AND WILL H. MOORE.  (1997)  Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic 
Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior.  International Studies Quarterly 41 (1): 171-184. 
35 
 
DREHER, AXEL AND NATHAN JENSEN.  (2013)  Country or Leader?  Political Change and UN 
General Assembly Voting.  European Journal of Political Economy 29:183-196. 
DREHER, AXEL, PETER NUNNENKAMP, AND RAINER THIELE.  (2008)  Does US Aid Buy UN 
General Assembly Votes?  A Disaggregated Analysis.  Public Choice 136 (1): 139-164. 
DREHER, AXEL AND JAN-EGBERT STURM.  (2012)  Do the IMF and the World Bank Influence 
Voting in the UN General Assembly?  Public Choice 151 (1): 363-397. 
FORDHAM, BENJAMIN O.  (1998)  Building the Cold War Consensus: The Political Economy of 
US National Security Policy, 1949-1951.  Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
GARTZKE, ERIK.  (1998)  Kant We All Just Get Along?: Opportunity, Willingness, and the 
Origins of the Democratic Peace.  American Journal of Political Science 42 (1): 1-27. 
GAUBATZ, KURT TAYLOR.  (1996)  Democratic States and Commitment in International 
Relations.  International Organization 50 (1): 109-139. 
GEDDES, BARBARA.  (1999)  What Do We Know About Democratization after 20 Years? Annual
 Review of Political Science 2: 115-144. 
GEDDES, BARBARA, JOSEPH WRIGHT AND ERICA FRANTZ.  (2012)  Authoritarian Regimes: A 
New Data Set. Manuscript. Available at http://dictators.la.psu.edu/ (Accessed May 10, 
2012). 
GIBLER, DOUGLAS M.  (2009)  International Military Alliances, 1648-2008.  Washington, DC: 
Congressional Quarterly Press. 
GOEMANS, HENK E., KRISTIAN SKREDE GLEDITSCH, AND GIACOMO CHIOZZA. (2009)  Introducing
 Archigos: A Data Set of Political Leaders. Journal of Peace Research 46 (2): 269-283. 
HAAS, MARK L.  (2005)  The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989.  Ithaca:  
Cornell University Press. 
36 
 
HAGAN, JOE D.  (1989)  Domestic Political Regime Change and Third World Voting 
Realignments in the United Nations, 1946-1984. International Organization 43 (3): 505-
541. 
LAI, BRIAN AND DANIEL S. MOREY.  (2006)  Impact of Regime Type on the Influence of US 
Foreign Aid.  Foreign Policy Analysis 2 (4): 385-404. 
LEEDS, BRETT ASHLEY AND MICHAELA MATTES.  (2007)  Alliance Politics During the Cold War: 
Aberration, New World Order, or Continuation of History?  Conflict Management and 
Peace Science 24 (3): 183-199. 
LEEDS, BRETT ASHLEY, MICHAELA MATTES, AND JEREMY S. VOGEL.  (2009)  Interests, 
Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments.  American Journal of 
Political Science 53 (2): 461-476. 
LIPSON, CHARLES.  (2003)  Reliable Partners.  Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
MARSHALL, MONTY G., KEITH JAGGERS, AND TED ROBERT GURR.  (2010)  Polity IV Project: 
Dataset Users’ Manual. College Park: University of Maryland.  Available at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2010.pdf (Accessed April 20, 2012). 
MARTIN, LISA L.  (2000)  Democratic Commitments.  Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
MCGILLIVRAY, FIONA AND ALISTAIR SMITH. (2008)  Punishing the Prince: A Theory of 
Interstate Relations, Institutions, and Leader Change. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
MILNER, HELEN V.  (1999)  The Political Economy of International Trade.  Annual Review of 
Political Science 2: 91-114. 
MOON, BRUCE E.  (1985)  Consensus or Compliance? Foreign Policy Change and External 
Dependence. International Organization 39 (2): 297-329. 
37 
 
MORAVSCIK, ANDREW.  (1997)  Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International 
Politics.  International Organization 51 (4): 513-553. 
NARIZNY, KEVIN.  (2003)  Both Guns and Butter, or Neither:  Class Interests in the Political 
Economy of Rearmament.  American Political Science Review 97 (2): 203-220. 
NARIZNY, KEVIN.   (2007)  The Political Economy of Grand Strategy.  Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
OLCOTT, MARTHA BRILL.  (2005)  Central Asia’s Second Chance.  Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment. 
POTRAFKE, NIKLAS.  (2009)  Does Government Ideology Influence Political Alignment with the 
US?  An Empirical Analysis of Voting in the UN General Assembly.  The Review of 
International Organizations 4 (3): 245-268.  
RATHBUN, BRIAN C.  (2004)  Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace 
Enforcement in the Balkans.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
RAY, JAMES LEE.  (2003)  Explaining Interstate Conflict and War:  What Should Be Controlled 
For?  Conflict Management and Peace Science 20 (1): 1-31. 
SHOEMAKER, M. WESLEY.  (2013)  Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States 2013.  
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 
SOLINGEN, ETEL.  (2007)  Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
SNYDER, JACK.  (1991)  Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition.  Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
STREZHNEV, ANTON AND ERIK VOETEN. (2013)  United Nations General Assembly Voting Data.   
Available at http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/12379 (Accessed March 9, 2014).  
38 
 
TRUBOWITZ, PETER.  (1998)  Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American 
Foreign Policy.  Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press. 
VENGROFF, RICHARD.  (1976)  Instability and Foreign Policy Behavior: Black Africa in the UN.
 American Journal of Political Science 20 (3): 425-438. 
VOETEN, ERIK.  (2000)  Clashes in the Assembly. International Organization 54 (2): 185-215. 
VOETEN, ERIK.  (2001)  Domestic Institutional Change and the External Orientation of States. 
Georgetown University:  Manuscript. 
VOETEN, ERIK.  (2004)  Resisting the Lonely Superpower: Responses of States in the United 
Nations to US Dominance. Journal of Politics 66 (3): 729-754. 
VOETEN, ERIK. (2013) “Data and Analyses of Voting in the UN General Assembly.” in Routledge 
Handbook of International Organization, ed. Bob Reinalda. Routledge: London.  
WANG, T.Y.  (1999)  US Foreign Aid and UN Voting: An Analysis of Important Issues. 
International Studies Quarterly 43 (1): 199-210. 
 
 
